Europe’s Crisis: Reconsidering Solidarity with Leela Gandhi and Judith Butler by Covi, Giovanna
   
   
Synthesis: an Anglophone Journal of Comparative Literary Studies
Vol. 0, 2016
 
  
  Europe’s Crisis: Reconsidering Solidarity with
Leela Gandhi and Judith Butler
Covi Giovanna Università degli Studi di
Trento/University of Trento
https://doi.org/10.12681/syn.16231
 
  Copyright © 2016 Giovanna Covi 
   
  
   
To cite this article:
Covi, G. (2016). Europe’s Crisis: Reconsidering Solidarity with Leela Gandhi and Judith Butler. Synthesis: an
Anglophone Journal of Comparative Literary Studies, 0(9), 147-157. doi:https://doi.org/10.12681/syn.16231
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 06:59:38 |
Synthesis 9 (Fall 2016)                                                                                                                       147 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Europe’s Crisis:  
Reconsidering Solidarity with Leela Gandhi and Judith 
Butler 
 
 
Giovanna Covi 
 
  
for William V. Spanos, who has shown the way 
 
 
The idea called Europe is important. It deserves loving and nourishing care to grow 
well and to return its promise. It is a visionary idea shared by winners and losers of 
World War II, by survivors of the Nazi-Fascist regimes and the Shoah, by large and 
small countries. It is still little more than just an idea: so far, it has only yielded the 
suspension of inner wars among the states that became members of the European 
Union. It is only a germ. Yet, its achievement is outstanding: in the face of the 
incessant proliferation of wars around the globe, it has secured lasting peace to an 
increasing number of nations since the 1950s. 
The idea called Europe is also vague. It has pursued its aim of ending the 
frequent and bloody wars between neighbours mainly through economic ties, as 
the Treaty of Maastricht’s failure to promote shared policies underscores. For over 
half a century, its common policies have been manifestly insufficient and 
inadequate. It is indeed still only a germ. And its limitations are tremendous: in the 
face of the rising threats to its own idea of peaceful cohabitation, of the internal rise 
of violent and hateful forces of sovereignty, of policies of domination, 
discrimination and exclusion, it is incapable of keeping Europe’s own promise. 
Such limitations are tangible in the debate about Grexit and the decision 
regarding Brexit, as well as in the political turn towards totalitarianisms in multiple 
states. The controversial and much discussed possible exits from the EU of the 
economically weakest and the financially strongest member states are just the 
liberal poles of a range of obscurantist actions that work against the growth of the 
democratic idea of Europe. Greece would be forced to re-invent the Drachma, 
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because it cannot comply with EU economic regulations; Britain and its Pound 
Sterling has decided to leave the EU to compete solo in the global economy, despite 
the privileges enjoyed by being part of EU up to now. Without Greece, Europe loses 
some of its cultural foundational identity. Without Britain, Europe loses some of its 
financial competitive edge. This symbolic binary is clearly an unacceptable 
simplification, which denies the UK’s cultural input and Greece’s material 
contribution. Yet, by leading the main reasoning and actions of the EU in the past 
years, this dichotomous simplification has morphed into an undermining 
conundrum. 
Embraced and undeniably paralysed by such opposition, the European 
conundrum clearly reveals the roots of its own fragility —the incapacity to 
conjugate culture and politics with economics. I offer the speculation that this 
conundrum may result from Europe’s reliance on a traditional concept of 
solidarity. R. Radhakrishnan invites us to consider which one, of all the different 
bearers of solidarity such as class, culture, political ideology, race, and ethnicity, is 
to be stressed, and when and why, so that we may be able to map a different 
cartography of global relationality. I too strongly believe that in order to overcome 
the present tragic impasse, the utmost intellectual and pragmatic care must be 
devoted to relationality. I understand relationality in feminist terms. In addition to 
nourishing relational subjectivities, as advocated for decades by feminist theory, we 
need to envision, recognize, and name the tensions and frictions, as well as the 
sharing and creativity that define relational collectivities, as recommended by 
feminist postcolonial queer studies. I suggest that this mapping requires a revision 
of the concept of solidarity. Solidarity has been traditionally conceived within a 
dualistic paradigm that we may be able to recast in the light of the theories offered 
by Judith Butler and Leela Gandhi with the aim to overcome Europe’s present 
deadlock. 
Europe was declaredly born out of the will of its founders for solidarity. As 
stated in the “Preamble” to the Treaty of Rome (25 March 1957), the intention is “to 
confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries”; the desire is 
“to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations”; the resolution is “to preserve and strengthen 
peace and liberty” (2). It is hard to disagree with such enlightened values based on 
the principle of solidarity. The question is what meanings does the word solidarity 
convey? It is worth recalling the history of the usage of this term. 
The word’s classical rooting is in the juridical Latin phrase in solidum obligari, 
referring to the obligation to pay one’s debt in full. Therefore, in solidum means 
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first of all entire, complete, whole. Two words in Italian derive from in solidum and 
carry its second related meaning: soldo (money) and soldato (soldier), referring to 
a person who in the Middle Ages would fight for money. These two words carry the 
meaning of solid, compact, robust. The classical rooting thus links solidarity to the 
law —specifically to money, in full, and to soldiers, robustly (solidarietà in 
Enciclopedia Treccani). It was not until the French Revolution that the modern 
rooting of solidarity came to be founded in social and ethical values. After 1789 the 
word solidarity came into modern English (and also modern Italian) from the 
French solidarité, stretching its meaning from the classical juridical and economic 
to the ideological semantic field. Only at this point in time, it came to indicate the 
nationalist feeling of fraternity shared by citizens within democracy, associated 
with political freedom and equality. Soon afterwards, its semantic field was further 
enlarged to include ethics: in 1848, social solidarity was coupled with class 
solidarity, and the word solidarity acquired ethical status with the related meaning 
of mutual help. The translation from French into English for the Chartist 
Convention of the International Workers Movement sealed this passage. Solidarité 
/ Solidarity came to indicate support for a common struggle for labour and civil 
rights; it signified more than community because it extended to foreigners, and 
more than philanthropy because the help was given on the grounds of the others, 
not one’s own. The modern rooting thus links solidarity to community —
specifically to the democratic nation, in fraternity, and to the working classes 
world-wide, in camaraderie. 
Within socialist ideology, solidarity expresses equality based on mutual trust; 
the word constellates the major literature, from Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels to 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (solidarity in Encyclopedia of Marxism). The sociologist 
Émile Durkheim articulates a theory of social solidarity, defined as organic, which, 
on the liberal front, is defended by John Maynard Keynes as a basis of the welfare 
state. This liberal adaptation shifts the action of the concept of solidarity from the 
free social movements to the structured state. In our time, within contemporary 
globalisation, solidarity expresses the dream for a humanity that is commonly 
shared; it is associated with love and charity; solidarity culture refers to the 
voluntary work to help the needy but also to the organisms for international 
collaboration that seek peace and human rights. Clearly within modernity, the 
concept of social solidarity, national and international, is deeply rooted in politics. 
As such, solidarity configures rather as a proposition than as a concept, in a way 
that is comparable to Étienne Balibar’s proposition of egaliberté, understood as an 
aporetic condition that is rooted in bourgeois ideology but has a revolutionary 
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potential, that is universal and pragmatic, a tension that determines the political 
field within which popular sovereignty without exclusions may occur. Hauke 
Brunkhorst’s Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community 
theoretically and historically analyses the potential of solidarity within 
globalisation and argues for a transnational civic solidarity rooted in social 
movements and normed by democratic institutions. 
However, the classical rooting in economics and law in Europe’s solidarity has 
not been severed. This double rooting, technical and nominal on the one hand, 
ideological and material on the other, raises a question: when we perceive a society 
as solidary, does its solidity derive from its budget or from its ethics? To reiterate: 
does a solid society guarantee that it is also a solidary society? To put it otherwise: 
is the material physical solid body of a solid society capable of opening itself to the 
risk of open mutual reciprocity? To recap it in yet different terms: is a society that 
we consider solid and solidary an ethical society, one that refers to human 
behaviour performed in relation, to collective action, to the intercultural exchange 
that produces shared meanings and values? Europe has not offered solid answers 
to these questions. Europe appears to be understanding solidarity 
schizophrenically, unable to join its foundational modern ideal with its classical 
praxis. 
Europe’s consciously declared foundations rest on the modern solidum, that is 
the dream of ethical grounding, as a political response to the deep fractures that 
had afflicted its peoples for so long, and so catastrophically, in the 20th century. It 
solidly sits on its invocation of solidarity against war. However, it has mostly 
yielded solidarity as economic cooperation, a solidum in its most classical meaning, 
whose solidity is grounded on solidarity for money only. Since 2004, following the 
terrorist attacks in Madrid, Europe has further reinforced the principle of such 
classical understanding of cooperation with the introduction of the Solidarity 
clause (Art. 222) to The Treaty of Lisbon. The accent easily and classically slided 
from soldo / money to soldato / soldier, by invoking “a spirit of solidarity” to “act 
jointly” with the specification that the “Union shall mobilise all the instruments at 
its disposal, including the military resources” if “a Member State is the object of a 
terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster”. Thus, the 
institutionalisation of Europe became increasingly solidly founded on the classical 
solidum of money and force, while the modern solidum of mutual social and moral 
support became increasingly confined to its merely rhetorical original promise. 
This is why, when faced with the Greek economic crisis, the EU proved incapable of 
displaying the modern solidum declared in its own founding document —the 
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solidarity of social sharing and mutual help. Europe’s embrace of the classical 
economic solidum appears to have dissolved its own constitutional principle rooted 
in the modern social and ethical solidum. Such amnesia, Europe’s incapacity to 
express social solidarity for its weakest members while pursuing economic 
solidarity for the strongest ones, unsurprisingly matches its incapability to enact 
solidarity for human rights when faced with the repeating tragedy of migrants and 
refugees, weak constituencies of labour and asylum seekers coming from the 
outside.  
I am speculating that by casting the concept of solidarity within a binary rooting 
economical-technical vs. social-ideological, Europe may have culturally embedded 
its own paralysis. The technical and the ideological appear mutually irreducible, 
which prevents us from conceiving a middle ground where relations become 
possible. It may preclude us from imagining a field on which to act. It causes the 
foreclosure of the political. Within this frame, the technical is assumedly neutral, 
while the ideological is disembodied. Their irreducibility bans both imagination 
and agency, the poetical and the political without which change is impossible. I am 
arguing that a solidarity etymologically conceptualised as an exclusive binary —
either the classical material or the modern ideal— may concur to deterring its own 
political enactment, including also the enactment of a political economy without 
which even the minimal achievement of a monetary cooperation is significantly 
weakened. 
I would like to add a further consideration. I see an additional shortcoming in 
the solidarity of Europe’s origin: it was generated by a commonality against wars 
among Member States. By conceiving the modern ideal of sharing as a form of 
giving help, which entails a giver and a receiver, an active and a passive actor, 
Europe planted its solidarity within the active matrix of a collective constituency 
shaped by pulling its forces against an emergency —the devastation of war and 
totalitarianisms. It is precisely in this negativity of Europe’s birth, a birth against 
rather than for, that I detect a fundamental, possibly fatal limitation. Seventy years 
since its emergency, it is no longer a sufficient raison d’être that Europe merely 
exists against inner wars among its Members. Today Europe is urgently called to 
face the challenge of being capable not only of working against inner wars but also 
of working for transnational peace. Its own existence is at stake. The question 
Europe must now face is: can its founding concept of solidarity be conceived as 
solidarity for and not just solidarity against; can its solidarity nourish being 
solidal for —for peace instead of just against war, for humanitarian collaboration 
instead of just monetary competition against other currencies? 
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Unfortunately, the signs are not reassuring: Europe seems to be falling apart 
when called on to deliver its solidarity both for Greece, an inside member state, and 
for the refugees, outside humanity. The day Britain voted to exit the EU, 4,500 
people were rescued in the Mediterranean near Sicily. Since the Schengen 
agreement, the estimated number of dead from attempted sea-crossings to date is 
at least 35,000 —a figure that evokes the estimated “sixty million and more” (Toni 
Morrison) of the Black Atlantic and produces another catastrophic image, that of 
the Mediterranean Cemetery. 
An alternative mold for understanding solidarity relationally and reciprocally 
can be located in the ideas of radical democracy as defined by Leela Gandhi and in 
the concept of vulnerability as defined by Judith Butler. Considered together, these 
ideas help me conceptualise solidarity otherwise, and I want to hope more 
effectively, in the light of the present European impasse and bleak expectations. We 
need desperately, I believe, to couple the awareness that the “Greek Crisis is 
Europe’s Crisis is Global Crisis,” as in the title of our panel, with the dream that 
Europe’s solidarity for peace in the world, for nonviolent civic society becomes a 
possibility. This original dream looked possible again not too long ago, when the 
Berlin wall fell, but now that too many walls are being built around Europe and 
across the Mediterranean the dream has turned into fear —fear by and of Europe. I 
would go as far as saying, without apologies, that we need to take the responsibility 
to propose another utopia, and I hope that this new utopia may be pursued by 
engaging propositional, risk-taking thinking. The circumstances urge us to 
relinquish the luxury of merely thinking negatively, an inadequacy that has 
characterised leftist thinking (and acting) to the point of paralysis, a negativity that 
has diluted into nothing and given space to the proliferation of obscurantist forces. 
Gandhi’s conceptualisation of a community of affects (Affective Communities) 
sharing the common good through an ethics of imperfection (Common Good) and a 
politics of becoming minor (“Utonal Life”) offers me the opportunity to envision 
the goal. What further encourages me to undertake the task is Butler’s definition of 
solidarity as a “a mode of sustaining conflict in politically productive ways, a 
practice of contestation” that produces a culture capable of exposing the “self-
difference” at the core of each political position (“Merely Cultural” 37). I am also 
inspired by her articulation of vulnerability, in particular the one specified in 
“Rethinking Vulnerability and Resistance” where Butler underlines that 
vulnerability is relational and necessary for thinking resistance. 
I would reiterate that we need a utopia that is not ideal and perfect, but rather 
one that may take place, albeit imperfectly, in this world, here and now—an 
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incongruously possible utopia. And, I would add with enthusiasm, that Gandhi’s 
nonviolent thinking helps me picture such paradox. The new utopia I am calling for 
is not grounded on ideology but is rather differently and temporarily articulated 
day after day, through the one-to-one relationships that each person shapes in their 
interaction with other persons, in the name of the common good that is defined by 
our living on this planet. This is a utopia in the plural —utopias articulated in 
multiple languages and from different locations yet seeking a common language. 
Each one is a fragment whose relations with other fragments produce a coming 
together, an assembly that may lead, perhaps surprisingly, possibly imperfectly, 
even magically at times, towards the desired change. 
Gandhi helps me think about this change positively and radically through her 
persuasive philosophical articulation of radical democracy, as nonviolent practice, 
ahimsatic mode, utonal life, and postcolonial historiography. Her call for becoming 
less in order to relate to each other as ordinary people, for accepting imperfection 
in order to counter the totalitarian, colonial, and liberal frame of domination, leads 
us to build a nonviolent society —neither a luxury nor an option in the face of 
Europe’s paralysis. At the centre of her “politics of friendship” is the Derridean 
notion of hospitality, which allows Gandhi to declare that such politics yields a 
sociality within which guest-friends are never known in advance. This is radical 
relational subjectivity. Acting under such conditions of unconstituted subjecthood 
requires countercultural revolutionary practices and inventive ethical enterprises 
(Affective Communities 9). It requires us to deploy “solidarities” that “simply 
cannot be fixed in advance” and “a utopian mentality” that shows the way forward 
to a genuine cosmopolitanism: always open to the risky arrival of those not quite, 
not yet, covered by the privileges which secure our identity and keep us safe” 
(Affective Communities 31). The fierce activism that Gandhi invokes embraces a 
solidarity that takes the risk of affective incongruous relations among subjects who 
pursue self-ruination. This pursuit requires a politics that is also a poetics, a 
counter-narrative that does not repress desire and imagination in order to pursue 
cognition and justice. Gandhi is clear on this point when she shows that, without 
poetics, politics is reduced to utilitarian joylessness (Affective Communities 142-
76). On the contrary, a joyful poetics / politics, in my understanding, allows us to 
envision a middle ground between the monetary and the ethical within which 
solidarity may act materially and ethically. 
I hear an echo of this positioning in Butler’s “Merely Cultural,” where she 
suggests that solidarity should not be based on the obliteration of the differences 
between identities, but rather on the “synthesis of a set of conflicts” and invokes “a 
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practice of contestation” within which each political position discloses its own “self-
difference” and does not pursue identitarian assimilation (37). Thus conceived, 
solidarity becomes a cultural production capable of turning conflict into positive 
politics. Further, in Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly, Butler 
talks about an ethos of solidarity as a force that affirms mutual, reciprocal 
dependency. This proposition takes us beyond the conception of social solidarity 
rooted in modernity and allows us to see that ethical questions are always 
implicated in economic ones (22). When we act together under conditions that are 
devastating, Butler argues, it is precisely “the gathering of bodies under duress” 
that has the value of “persistence and resistance” (23). Thus, Butler is inviting us to 
think about vulnerability and agency together, to think about bodies that are 
actively and inactively supported both by infrastructures and social solidarity. 
Butler considers feminist action as the action by subjects regarded as more 
vulnerable and yet subjects who seek a politics that prevents them from being 
targeted as vulnerable (Chapter IV). She shows how precarity and vulnerability 
may become agency, and may express new forms of democracy and solidarity 
through spontaneous public gathering of bodies that show their capacity to act 
without deliberating in advance their force for resistance. By putting the body at 
the centre of solidarity, I understand that Butler liberates philosophy from being 
confined to the realm of the intellectual as opposed to the physical, from banning 
sensibility in the name of sense, from being locked up within the merely 
conceptual, and frames a philosophy that allows the mind to be part of the body. As 
such, it also allows subjectivity to be framed outside the Eurocentric Humanistic 
tradition which, as Rosi Braidotti well demonstrates in her call for the posthuman, 
equates the Subject, the Self with consciousness, universal rationality, and self-
regulating ethical behaviour, and the Other with the sexualised, racialised, and 
naturalised, less than human, disposable bodies. 
Butler’s definition of agency joined with vulnerability is revolutionary because it 
may provide a way out of the solidarity conundrum in which Europe, with/out 
Greece and Britain, is presently stuck. Moya Lloyd is particularly clear when she 
illustrates that Butler articulates not merely a concept of vulnerability, but rather a 
politics of vulnerability. This opens up a space, which is irreducibly corporeal, 
where bodies appear to other bodies to act in concert by virtue of their ethical 
responsiveness rather than any aprioristic recognition of their individual existence. 
This implication in the lives of others leads to an understanding of ethics as always 
responsive, relational, and collective. Thus politics, presented by Butler as possible 
under conditions of precarity, has the power “to contest the terms of 
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recognisability that position certain lives as precaritised and unintelligible” (Lloyd 
224).  
I thereby understand the resistance of the vulnerable to be a form of critique 
performed by bodily encounters. Such bodies claim recognition within the public 
sphere and in the process reconstitute it. Their encounters operate successfully 
only under principles of nonviolence. Precisely within the nonviolent paradigm that 
Leela Gandhi so finely articulates for radical democracy, I think, solidarity can be 
recast as ahimsa or self-ruination, as the willingness to become less in order to 
relate. This model allows for relations to no longer stand in hierarchical order—
neither dictatorially through domination nor liberally through generosity 
(Common Cause 10). Such relations, Gandhi contends, are not between Self and 
Other, but are rather exchanges among singularities who seek inclusiveness 
through affects, exchanges among differences who are performed under conditions 
of equality; they are ruled by a politics of friendship and linked together by 
affiliations.  
Clearly this conceptualisation challenges forms of subjecthood, both individual 
and national, based on the masculinist grounding of domination and exclusion, on 
posing an Other. It requires the joining of the cultural and the social performed by 
a poetical politics and a political poetics that speaks in multiple languages, inhabits 
borders, and does not categorise people according to abstract taxonomies. A radical 
democracy embraces an ethics of imperfection in its pursuit of community on a 
one-to-one basis. The ‘people’ in radical democracy become a temporary, 
fragmented, yet powerful constituency through the sharing of their own gathering, 
unlike the ideal disembodied entity they have been reduced to within liberal 
representative democracy. Subjecthood within this paradigm can only be relational 
and therefore feminist, non-normative. 
Gandhi’s heuristic epistemology entails anarchism, disobedience, no-saying, 
imperfection, the staging of nonviolent militancy. Within anti-colonial socialist, 
anarchist, feminist communities it seeks spiritual and political practices of 
becoming less; it studies historical cases in which people managed to pursue 
horizontal infinity by blocking the continuation of war and the perpetration of 
colonialism. Gandhi argues that these nonviolent practices are always a work in 
progress, incomplete and imperfect; they are always non-normative, never 
utilitarian. This is precisely what makes them profoundly democratic. Most 
importantly, she specifies in her “Lectio Magistralis,” sometimes they are not even 
pacifist: sometimes nonviolence must respond to violence through civil 
disobedience. These practices are not lead by any ethics of virtue that pursues the 
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fullness of the subject. Rather, they are distinguished by an ethical commitment to 
the revolutionary ordinariness of the social contract.  
Nonviolence thus is defined not as the opposite of violence, nor is peace 
inflected as other from war, but rather as a practice of becoming, as the rejection of 
any hierarchical categorisation and the abdication of power. Nonviolence embraces 
negativity by asking men to renounce to their own masculinity and by encouraging 
women to cultivate their own no-saying in order to take better care of the world, to 
say that no, we are not yet done with radical democracy. Nonviolence is a practice 
of civil disobedience. Only by rejecting the perfectionism that joins fascism, 
imperialism, and liberalism to democracy, Gandhi argues, can democracy cease to 
be a utopia and become a possibility. It can become the possible utopia, the 
possible eternity of speaking a common language and being ordinary in the sense of 
being in common with others. Through ahimsatic nonviolence we can all have a 
glimpse of the horizontal infinity at the centre of our mortality—the only possible 
immortality we can dream of (“Lectio Magistralis” 21). Within a likewise frame, 
Butler envisions solidarity as the carrier of the revolutionary force of relational 
ethics expressed by vulnerable bodies who assemble publicly to become a 
constituency. Relationality both for Gandhi and for Butler is conceived as subject 
formation; their politics/poetics yields hope for transformation precisely because it 
is not functionally grounded on pre-constituted identities. 
I like to hope that conceiving solidarity as ethical ordinariness and vulnerability 
may offer Europe the cultural means to face the dramatic challenges of the present. 
Since the crisis presents us not only with economic and political risks but also with 
the limitation of classical Humanism and most compellingly with humanitarian 
catastrophes, I trust that engaging such forms of thinking differently is more than 
an academic exercise and may yield some practical transformation. 
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